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1. Introduction 
Due to their toxic properties, synthetic pesticides have become widely used in the past 
century to combat agricultural pests and diseases, and hence to achieve higher yields. 
However, these same properties are the reason that pesticides may cause harm to the 
environment and human health, as the example of persistent organic pollutants has 
shown.1 Although pesticide risks have long been recognised and less hazardous pesticide 
products and lower input agricultural production methods have become available, 
regulatory approaches by state actors have thus far failed to achieve a significant 
reduction of pesticide risks. However, it seems that the present broad concern about the 
quality and safety of food products, fuelled under the influence of increased economic 
globalisation and international trade, is providing an impetus for more adequate and 
effective regulation by state as well as non-state actors, stimulating the conversion to 
more sustainable agricultural practices.  
 
This paper aims to determine the global pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its present 
reconfiguration from the perspective of legal pluralism. It furthermore aims to identify 
future options, taking into account the possible roles of state and non-state actors. Section 
2 explains the challenge of pesticide risk reduction. Section 3 discusses the concept of 
legal pluralism and its global relevance. Section 4 examines the pattern of regulation and 
its reconfiguration focusing on distributive and normative aspects. Section 5 explores the 
way forward by outlining a blueprint for a global framework to achieve a progressive 
reduction of pesticide risks. Section 6 considers in retrospect the concept of legal 
pluralism and its application in research. Section 7 presents final observations.  
2. The challenge of pesticide risk reduction 
Agricultural pesticides are associated with several environmental and human health risks 
during the different stages of their life-cycle, that in its simplest form consists of the 
stages of production, marketing, use, and residues.2 In the production stage, site-specific 
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  See e.g.: R.L. Carson (1962). Silent spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 400 p.  
2
  Th. Colborn, D. Dumanoski & J. Peterson Myers (1996). Our stolen future: are we threatening our 
fertility, intelligence, and survival? A scientific detective story. New York: Dutton, 306 p.; P. 
Hough (1998). The global politics of pesticides. Forging consensus from conflicting interests. 
London: Earthscan, 226 p.; M. Jacobs & B. Dinham (2003). Silent invaders: pesticides, 
livelihoods and women’s health. London/New York: Zed Books, 342 p.; J. Pretty (ed.) (2005). 
The pesticide detox: towards a more sustainable agriculture. London: Earthscan, 240 p. 
emissions to the environment may occur as the result of production processes of pesticide 
substances and products, and workers in pesticide plants and people living in the 
neighbourhood of such production facilities may be at risk of exposure to hazardous 
emissions and industrial accidents. 
 
In the marketing stage, emissions may take place during transport and by leaching from 
storage depots. Such depots may form a considerable risk for the local population, 
especially in developing countries and countries with economies in transition.3 In the use 
stage, emissions are related to the fact that pesticides are never used entirely efficiently 
by the receiving crops. Small but significant quantities of pesticides are lost directly to 
the environment. Some is vaporised, eventually to be deposited in rainfall, some remains 
in the soil, while some reaches surface and groundwater by runoff or leaching. Pesticides 
in groundwater, surface water and drinking water are now the most serious environmental 
problems associated with pesticide use, and may also result in negative impacts on 
biodiversity, climate conditions and the ozone layer. People working at farms and those 
living next to fields and greenhouses may experience damage to their health due to 
pesticide poisoning.4  
 
In the residue stage, consumers may be exposed to critical levels of pesticide residues in 
food that could cause chronic or acute health effects. Despite scientific effort in this area, 
the debate on the health implications of pesticide residues is still surrounded with many 
scientific uncertainties.5 Such uncertainties inter alia include the potential of pesticides to 
cause cancer, to disrupt the hormone and reproductive system, and to bring damage to the 
nervous system. In general, there is a lack of reliable data on the long-term consequences 
of exposure to pesticide residues and on the ‘cocktail’ effects of multiple residues. 
Children are considered to be most vulnerable to the risks of pesticide residues, because 
their bodies are still developing and they are exposed to relatively higher doses than 
grown-up people. 
 
In order to limit pesticide risks, a wide range of regulatory options for pesticide risk 
reduction is in principle available, such as pesticide bans, pesticide authorisation 
decisions, agricultural production standards, HACCP guidelines, traceability schemes, 
and pesticide maximum residue levels (MRLs). Importantly, agricultural production 
standards may define several innovative agricultural methods, including: 1) applying 
good agricultural practice (GAP); 2) applying ‘fewer chemical inputs’, or integrated 
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  In the past decades, stockpiles of pesticides have accumulated in developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition as the consequence of government procurement policies, 
development assistance programmes, and dumping of outdated products by pesticide companies. 
4
  See e.g.: WHO (2002). The World Health Report 2002 – Reducing risks, promoting healthy life. 
Geneva: WHO. According to WHO estimations, there are worldwide three million severe cases of 
pesticide poisoning each year and as many as 20,000 unintentional deaths, primarily in developing 
countries. In addition to unintentional deaths, there are an estimated 200,000 intentional deaths 
annually, as a number of pesticides are used for committing suicide, with the highest incidence 
levels in South-East Asia. 
5
  See e.g. the comprehensive overviews of research as presented in the three-monthly Research 
Monitors of PAN UK. 
control, including, for example, integrated pest management (IPM), integrated crop 
management (ICM), and integrated production, and 3) applying ‘no chemical inputs,’ or 
organic farming. Notably, the precise definitions and interpretations of these methods 
may considerably vary between actors.  
3. The concept of legal pluralism and its application 
The concept of legal pluralism was initially developed by legal anthropologists. This so-
called ‘classic’ legal pluralism focused on ‘primitive’ societies with more than only one 
central agency making law, resulting for example in governmental and tribal law.6 In a 
later stage, several legal pluralists have shifted their focus, and discovered strong pluralist 
traces in the present global societal order. This ‘new’ legal pluralism, or global legal 
pluralism, holds the view that legal pluralism is a common social feature and claims that 
we witness today an increase of legal pluralism and differentiation under the influence of 
increased economic globalisation.7  
  
The Portuguese socio-legal theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos was one of the first 
scholars who used the ideas about legal pluralism developed by legal anthropologists in a 
broader sense. According to Santos, the present situation is such that “[R]ather than being 
ordered by a single legal order, modern societies are ordered by a plurality of legal 
orders, interrelated and socially distributed in different ways.”8 He further argued that we 
are now entering the period of postmodern legal pluralism that focuses on “suprastate, 
transnational legal orders coexisting in the world system with both state and infrastate 
legal orders.”9  
 
In his book “Global law without a state”, Günther Teubner launched the thesis that 
“globalization of law creates a multitude of decentred law-making processes in various 
sectors of civil society, independently of nation-states.”10 He argued that lex mercatoria, 
the transnational law of economic transactions, is the most successful example of global 
law without a state, but also observed that various other sectors of world society are 
developing a global law of their own in ‘relative insulation’ from the state, official 
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  See e.g.: F. von Benda-Beckmann (1970). Rechtspluralismus in Malawi - Geschichtliche 
Entwicklung und heutige Problematik eines ehemals britischen Kolonialgebietes . München: 
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Papers. Dordrecht: Foris Publications, pp. 77-95. 
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  See e.g.: S.E. Merry (1988). Legal pluralism. In: Law and Society Review, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 869-
896; B. de Sousa Santos (1995). Toward a new common sense: law, science and politics in the 
paradigmatic transition. New York/ London: Routledge, 614 p.; G. Teubner (ed.) (1997). Global 
law without a state. Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 350 p.; F. Snyder 
(1999). Governing economic globalisation: global legal pluralism and European Law. In: 
European Law Journal, vol.5, no. 4, pp. 334-374. 
8
  B. de Sousa Santos (1995). Toward a new common sense: law, science and politics in the 
paradigmatic transition. New York/London: Routledge, p. 114. 
9
  Ibidem, p. 116.  
10
  G. Teubner (1997). Foreword: legal regimes of non-state actors. In: G. Teubner (ed.), Global law 
without a State, Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, p. xiii.  
international policies and public international law.11 According to Teubner, this new 
‘living law’ of the world is nourished not from stores of traditions but from the ongoing 
self-reproduction of highly technical, highly specialized, often formally organized and 
rather narrowly defined, global networks of an economic, cultural, academic or 
technological nature.12 
 
Hence, the concept of legal pluralism stretches the boundaries of law in response to the 
emergence of new sites and forms of governance in which non-state actors are 
performing prominent regulatory roles.13 It furthermore stresses the importance of 
interaction between different sites of governance, their procedures and normative output. 
Applying the concept of legal pluralism to a specific issue-area, it is proposed to 
distinguish at least the following stages, including the identification of sites of 
governance in a specific issue-area, the description of their regulatory output, the analysis 
of interaction and the construction of the pattern of legal pluralism. The latter helps to 
identify options for improvement. 
4. The global pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its reconfiguration 
In the past decades, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation has become increasingly 
diverse and complex. This section examines the pattern and its reconfiguration focusing 
on different aspects. First, it elaborates upon the division of regulatory roles between 
state and non-state actors. Second, it looks at the sources of authority. Third, it elaborates 
on the steering modes of regulation. Fourth, it focuses on regulatory objectives. Fifth, it 
considers regulatory activity in the different stages of the pesticide life-cycle.  
Division of regulatory roles 
Focusing on the division of regulatory roles, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and 
its reconfiguration can be characterised by shifting roles of state and non-state actors in 
processes of rule-making, rule-implementation and rule-enforcement. More specifically, 
an increased regulatory involvement of non-state actors can be identified in the public as 
well as private domain. Concerning rule-making, it is evident that non-state actors are 
increasingly participating in legislative processes by state actors and that, in addition, 
they are increasingly taking over the regulatory initiative by developing their own forms 
of regulation, be it self-regulation, single-actor regulation or multi-actor regulation. 
 
In relation to rule-implementation, a similar dual shift has taken place. Public regulation 
increasingly addresses non-state actors to assist with the implementation of rules and 
regulations, as the examples of the FAO International Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides (1985), the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
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Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade (1998) and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (2001) demonstrate. In addition, national non-state actors are increasingly 
implementing transnational standards, such as the IFOAM organic guarantee system 
(1980) and the GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegetables (2001). This is reflected 
in the rise of the private certification industry that can be considered to fulfil the function 
of the executive power in relation to private regulation. However, compared with public 
administrations, these private administrative bodies are less independent, as they may 
find themselves in an ambivalent position because they assess the performance of their 
customers and, at the same time, have an interest in securing customer loyalty. Moreover, 
they can be tied to the standard setting entity through accreditation, which makes their 
split responsibilities even more difficult to combine.  
 
With regard to rule-enforcement, there is a similar trend of enhanced non-state actor 
involvement. Whereas state actors increasingly request non-state actors to assist in the 
monitoring of the implementation of public regulation, non-state actors increasingly 
develop provisions for monitoring, control and sanctioning as a component of their own 
rule systems. Significantly, private regulation based on own authority may strengthen the 
enforcement of public regulation by emphasizing its content and backing it up with 
market-based sanctions. The GlobalGAP system, for example, requires compliance with 
the national legislation concerning authorised substances and maximum residue levels in 
the country of production and, if relevant, the country of destination. It thus gives a 
stronger backing to state regulation by adding its own monitoring and control 
mechanisms to the state actor repertoire, plus the powerful sanction of withdrawing a 
producer’s license-to-supply. 
Source of authority 
Focusing on the source of authority, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its 
reconfiguration can be characterised by a relatively stronger emphasis on private 
regulation. Based on the identity of regulator and regulated, it is proposed to refine this 
rather broad category of private regulation into co-regulation, self-regulation, single-actor 
regulation, and multi-actor regulation. 
  
Applying this typology to the IFOAM organic guarantee system, it is evident that the 
regulating entity is formally constituted by the member organisations, mostly consisting 
of organic farmers’ associations and companies that deliver services to organic producers, 
whereas the regulated party are the same producers and organisations. A further 
inspection of the functioning of the system makes clear that organic producers determine 
its actual core in all stages of the regulatory process, as rule-making is ultimately in the 
hands of the IFOAM World Board consisting of organic producers’ associations, and 
rule-implementation is mostly the responsibility of dedicated organic certification bodies, 
with the quality of the performance of certification bodies controlled by a voluntary 
accreditation programme operated by a subsidiairy of IFOAM. Furthermore, rule-
enforcement is performed by the same certification bodies, which carry responsibility for 
rule-implementation. In sum, it is therefore argued that the IFOAM system is a form of 
self-regulation, as the structure of the system is such that regulator and regulated are 
essentially identical.  
 
Taking a closer look at the GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegetables, it is clear that 
the regulating entity is formally constituted by a combination of retailers and agricultural 
producers, whereas the regulated party are the producers. However, there is a certain 
power asymmetry in favour of the retailers, which reveals itself in the different stages of 
the regulatory process. With regard to rule-making, the governing structure of 
GlobalGAP is such that retailers and the world’s largest suppliers have the strongest 
positions in standard setting. Concerning rule-implementation, certification bodies are in 
charge of elaborating and applying the standards. However, they have to operate within 
the strict boundaries set by GlobalGAP, as exemplified by the requirement of mandatory 
GlobalGAP accreditation and the strict GlobalGAP quality programme for certification 
bodies. Most importantly, certification bodies are dependent on the retailers for their 
license-to-operate. In relation to rule-enforcement, the retailers of GlobalGAP dispose of 
the most effective sanction to stimulate the adherence to rules and regulations, namely the 
threat of withdrawing a producer’s license-to-supply. In sum, it is therefore argued that 
the GlobalGAP system is a form of single-actor regulation, as the structure of the system 
is largely influenced by the apparent power asymmetry. 
 
In sum, the application of this typology based on source of authority can thus provide 
clarity about issues of power distribution in private regulation. Moreover, it may offer 
insights in the democratic content of non-state actor approaches, as it focuses on issues of 
representation and decision-making power. 
Steering modes of regulation 
Focusing on steering modes, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its 
reconfiguration can be characterised by a shift from hierarchy-based towards non-
hierarchical steering modes based on market mechanisms and consensus-seeking. This 
shift is strongly related to the fact that non-state actors from the private sector and civil 
society are increasingly performing regulatory roles. In order to provide insights into 
regulatory consequences of this shift, Table 1 combines the steering modes of hierarchy, 
market, and consensus-seeking with the different stages in regulatory processes.  
 
Table 1 Basic regulatory mechanisms in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction in agriculture 
Steering mode/stage Rule-making Rule-implementation Rule-enforcement 
 
Hierarchy-based Imposition Public law rights and 
obligations  
Public sanctions 
Market-based Negotiation Civil law rights and 
obligations 
Private sanctions 
Consensus-based Deliberation Voluntary commitment Social sanctions 
 
In the hierarchy-based steering mode, rules are imposed from above based on the 
principle of democratic representation, implemented through rights and obligations based 
on public law, and enforced through public law mechanisms that are linked to the 
privilege of citizenship. In the market-based steering mode, rules are made through 
negotiation based on market power, implemented through rights and obligations based on 
civil law, and enforced through private mechanisms that are linked to the privilege of 
market access. In the consensus-based mode of regulation, rules are made through 
deliberation based on common interests, implemented through commitment, and enforced 
through social mechanisms that are linked to the privilege of participation.  
 
Importantly, there can be in practice a less clear dividing line between the steering modes 
of public and private regulation than may appear at first sight. Practice shows that private 
regulation increasingly takes place within a triangle of hierarchy, market, and consensus-
seeking steering modes. This is certainly relevant in a situation of an asymmetrical 
relationship where a private regulator dominates a regulated party through market power, 
and consequently a situation has arisen of actual hierarchy. The same blurring of dividing 
lines can be recognised in certain forms of public regulation that use market-based 
instruments to achieve public policy goals.  
Regulatory objectives 
Focusing on regulatory objectives, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its 
reconfiguration can be characterised by an increased variety of interests and objectives. 
Whereas the initial focus of pesticide risk regulation was almost exclusively on the 
protection of national agriculture against pests from other countries and thus an increase 
of national agricultural production, the emphasis has subsequently shifted in the direction 
of international economic interests, such as the creation of a level playing field in the 
market for pesticide products, the facilitation of trade in agricultural products, and the 
stimulation of employment in the chemical industry. Simultaneously, objectives of 
environmental and human health protection have also come to the fore. 
 
Thus far, the argument of consumer health protection has been the main point of leverage 
for non-state actors to establish regulation aimed at pesticide risk reduction. Worker 
health and environment have had a secondary priority. Looking at the near future, it can 
be expected that consumer health protection will remain a high priority as new scientific 
evidence is continuously emerging, for example about hormone disruptive substances and 
substances potentially triggering Parkinson’s disease. In some respects, consumer health 
can be instrumental in reducing pesticide risks for the environment as well as worker 
health, but this is not necessarily the case. 
 
A recurrent theme in the debates on the regulation of pesticides concerns the 
determination of risk and the interpretation of scientific evidence. The interpretation of 
the actual risks involved and potential hazards differs widely between actors across levels 
and there are also differences of opinion about the safety margins to be taken into account 
in decision-making and the level of precaution to be considered. This divergence of 
interpretations and opinions is, for example, illustrated by the different status of pesticide 
substances under different regulatory regimes.  
 
In addition, actors may have different opinions about risk management options. A major 
issue concerns the question whether the ultimate objective of pesticide law and policy 
should be risk reduction as such, or combined with dependency and/or use reduction. As 
can be concluded from this paper, the present pattern of regulation reflects a broad 
consensus about the objective of risk reduction but less agreement about the reduction of 
dependency and use. At the national level, however, regulatory patterns can be radically 
different, as the examples of the Scandinavian countries demonstrate, putting 
considerable emphasis on dependency and use reduction.   
 
The consequence of multiple, and often opposing, interests and objectives is that they 
have to be weighed against each other in decision-making processes. Practice shows that 
state actors at governmental level experience difficulties to find a balance between the 
diverging interests at play. At different levels, they have been muddling through in 
establishing a coherent and effective law and policy on pesticides. This is, for example, 
demonstrated by the fact that the decisions concerning the objectives of legal instruments 
and their interpretation are often controversial and the definition process of crucial 
concepts postponed. In response to the paralysis of state actors, non-state actors have 
increasingly taken over the regulatory initiative in pesticide risk reduction matters, 
arguably better equipped to reconcile diverging objectives. In their new role, they 
increasingly claim to function as ‘agents of change’ in the process towards food safety 
and sustainability.  
 
A side-effect of the current regulatory pattern is that it favours the economic interests of 
multinational companies in the pesticide industry, seed industry, and food and retailing 
industry, because it facilitates a consolidation of market share and power through the 
establishment of additional governance structures. At the level of agricultural production, 
the increased influence of multinational companies has led to two opposing trends. On 
the one hand, it has resulted in an increased standardisation and commodification of the 
bulk of agricultural produce by creating increasingly homogeneous products. On the 
other hand, it has led to de-commodification through the development of specialty 
products based on high-technology for niche markets. Both developments have taken 
place at the expense of traditional agricultural biodiversity.  
Life-cycle of pesticides 
Focusing on the pesticide life-cycle, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its 
reconfiguration can be characterised by a shift towards greater involvement of non-state 
actors in the stages of production, marketing, use and residues. The pattern in the 
production stage has relatively changed the least and is still primarily being determined 
by state actors. Concerning the marketing stage, the pattern has become more diverse 
over the years, with state and non-state actors both regulating the status of pesticide 
substances, although the former are still in the dominant position. In the use stage, the 
pattern has become equally diverse but with an arguably increased dominance of non-
state actors. The regulatory pattern has also changed considerably in the residue stage, 
and is now being determined by state as well as non-state actors.  
 
Looking at the regulatory activity in the different stages of the pesticide life-cycle, it is 
apparent that state actors have concentrated so far on the marketing and residue stages, 
whereas non-state actors have focused especially on the use and residue stages. Notably, 
the group of non-state actors is far from homogeneous and consequently the focus of their 
activities diverges. From the examination of non-state actor initiatives, it is evident that 
civil society initiatives primarily focus on the use stage of pesticides whereas corporate 
initiatives put the emphasis on food safety aspects, such as pesticide residues in food 
products.  
 
As a result of the regulatory activity of state and non-state actors, the density of rules is 
relatively high in relation to residues which from the point of view of regulatory 
efficiency can be seen as counterproductive because the more advanced the stage in the 
life-cycle, the higher the costs of monitoring and enforcement. However, as long as 
consumer health is a higher priority on the agenda of politicians and broader society than 
the protection of the environment and worker health, the incidence of residues will 
remain the main point of leverage for enacting new rules and regulations by state and 
non-state actors.  
 
In contrast to the relatively high regulatory activity in the residue stage, the level of 
activity is rather low in the production stage. As the experience with persistent organic 
pollutants has demonstrated, it takes many years before even the most hazardous 
substances can be eliminated. In this respect, it is important to note that as long as a 
substance is being produced, it can always make a re-entry in agricultural production. In 
the end, a production ban at the international level is the most effective instrument to 
reduce pesticide risks. In this respect, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants has finally provided the means for the demise of several of the most hazardous 
substances by phasing out their production, marketing and use.  
 
Significantly, the current distribution of regulatory activity and rule density may indicate 
that a lack of production regulation at the international level leads to compensation 
through the regulation of the marketing, use and residues stages at other levels. Hence, 
the regulation of these stages may function in fact as a substitute for a global production 
ban, but leads at the same time to uneven levels of protection of the environment and 
human health worldwide. 
 
In sum, the combined regulatory approaches by state and non-state actors have provided a 
certain impetus to reduce environmental and human health risks in the different stages of 
the pesticide life-cycle. In addition, the effectiveness of these regulatory approaches has 
been further strengthened by synergetic interaction in vertical, horizontal and diagonal 
directions. However, on a global scale the progress achieved can be considered marginal. 
The experiences of the past 50 years have shown that the environmental and human 
health risks of pesticides are difficult to control and that an adequate level of protection is 
not evenly shared between all countries and citizens. More precisely, the current 
regulatory pattern mostly benefits the protection of the environment and human health in 
developed countries, but is lesser effective for developing countries with emerging 
economies and those with economies lagging behind. For example, despite the 
introduction of less harmful pesticides through technological innovation, the use of older 
substances from the highest WHO hazard classes is still commonplace in poorer countries 
that often have less strict authorisation rules and enforcement. 
5. A blueprint for a normative framework 
The previous section has discussed several characteristics of the pattern of pesticide risk 
regulation and its reconfiguration. Among the main shifts in governance have been a shift 
towards increased regulation at the international and transnational level, a shift towards 
increased involvement of non-state actors in regulatory processes, a shift towards legally 
non-binding forms of regulation, and a shift towards the increased regulation of further 
advanced stages of the pesticide life-cycle. In order to achieve the objective of 
responsibly dealing with pesticides by 2020, as agreed during the Johannesburg Summit 
in 2002, this section formulates the outlines of a normative framework for pesticide risk 
reduction. In particular, the focus is on how to improve the balance of regulatory power 
and the adequacy of rules.  
Balance of regulatory power 
In order to restore the balance of regulatory power, the current division of authority and 
responsibility between state and non-state actors needs reconsideration. From a public 
policy perspective, private regulation can be assumed to have certain advantages in 
comparison with public regulation, such as greater flexibility and adaptability of rules 
and the availability of expert knowledge. An additional argument for private regulation is 
that the costs of rule-making, rule-implementation and rule-enforcement are shifted to the 
regulated concerned. Under certain conditions, this can be considered as a form of 
internalisation of costs and, hence, an application of the polluter-pays principle. 
Furthermore, private regulation can fulfil several functions in the ‘shadow of the law’, 
such as providing a testing ground for regulation, preparing a suitable environment for 
regulation, and offering adequate mechanisms for compliance and control.14  
 
However, there are also important limitations to the potential of private regulation to help 
solve public policy problems, First, the scope of private regulation is limited, as the norm 
addressees are often a selected group. The addressees of the GlobalGAP programme, for 
example, are the agricultural producers that already have a relationship with the European 
retailers, or are in the race to capture such a position. Thus, the programme will not reach 
those suppliers who use other distribution channels to sell their produce. Second, it is 
important to recognise that some functions can only be performed by the state, such as 
ensuring the balance of regulatory power and the coordination of regulatory efforts.15 
However, the example of pesticide risk regulation has shown that state actors experience 
difficulties with the execution of these functions and have increasingly transferred the 
regulatory initiative into the hands of the private sector, arguably loosing control.  
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The limitations of private regulation have as a consequence that non-state actors can at 
best perform a transitional or complementary function in achieving public policy 
objectives. Thus, private regulation can be considered part of the solution but not the 
solution in itself. In order to respond to these limitations, it is argued that state actors 
should take back their primary responsibility for regulation, and develop a longer-term 
vision on pesticide risk reduction strategies to be established in appropriate frameworks 
of normative and procedural rules. In addition, state actors should adapt to the present 
regulatory reconfiguration by strengthening their steering and coordination capacities and 
by applying the possibilities that competition and anti-trust legislation offer more 
rigorously.  
 
Hence, state actors should aim to resume their responsibility as main regulators. At the 
same time, they should take advantage of the initiatives developed by non-state actors. 
Most importantly, the co-existence of state and non-state actor approaches could be the 
ideal starting point for developing a ‘smart’ mix of instruments to help agricultural 
producers make a transition towards sustainable agriculture. Accordingly, Gunningham 
(2007) argues that “there is not one solution, but it is essentially about seeking the right 
combination of partial solutions at different levels.”16 
 
As part of this smart mix, non-state actors can contribute to a further reduction of 
pesticide risks by developing competing initiatives using self-regulatory or multi-
stakeholder approaches. The latter approaches could be based on existing models, such as 
a stewardship council, a commodity roundtable, or a community-based initiative.17 From 
a democratic point of view, these approaches are preferable above single-actor regulation 
because they are based on stricter criteria of good governance by definition.  
Adequacy of rules 
In order to accelerate pesticide risk reduction, it is necessary to further develop the 
normative framework for pesticide risk reduction and make it more ambitious, 
encompassing and coherent. The main argument to regulate pesticide issues as much as 
possible at the international level is to create a level playing field not only in terms of 
trade opportunities but also in relation to the protection of the environment and human 
health.18 Importantly, regulatory activity at other levels should take place within certain 
boundaries imposed by international law. 
 
For a framework of normative rules, the FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and 
Use of Pesticides could serve as a point of departure, since it covers in principle all stages 
of the pesticide life-cycle and targets all pesticide substances. In addition, such a global 
law on pesticide risk reduction should consist of the following basic elements: 
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• Production stage: To phase out the hazardous substances from the WHO hazard classes of 
extremely hazardous (IA), highly hazardous (IB), moderately hazardous (II), and, as far 
as feasible, slightly hazardous (III) substances.  
• Marketing stage: To apply the precautionary and substitution principles more strictly 
during authorisation of pesticide substances and products. 
• Use stage:  
• To give an increased priority to the elaboration of internationally harmonised 
guidelines for IPM and their implementation in practice; 
• To start developing internationally harmonised definitions and guidelines for 
agricultural production methods aiming at higher levels of integration; 
• To apply the polluter pays principle more widely, for example by taxing the 
production, marketing and/or use of hazardous, patent-free pesticide products and to 
deposit the revenues in the Global IPM Facility. 
• To stimulate non-state actors to develop programmes using self-regulatory and multi-
stakeholder approaches. 
• Residue stage: To formulate aggregate MRLs and a final goal of residue-free produce.  
With a view to the use stage of pesticides, it is important for the longer-term that state actors 
develop a vision on the transition towards sustainable agricultural production methods. Such 
a transition can only happen step by step and will take many years. Therefore, this vision 
should be accompanied with concrete targets and timetables. Considering the conversion to 
IPM as a first step in a process towards further risk reduction, it is necessary, with a view to 
the progressive development of norms in the longer term, to examine the content of concepts 
with a higher level of integration. 
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Figure 1  
 
As a general rule, and as pointed out in Figure 1, it is argued that the higher the level of 
integration, the lower the level of pesticide risks. However, this statement needs to be 
nuanced as the extent of risk reduction largely depends on the definitions of the concepts 
concerned and their application in agricultural practice. There are strong and weak 
definitions in place for innovative agricultural production methods, such as organic 
agriculture and integrated control. Such weak definitions may have counterproductive 
effects. For example, a weak definition of organic agriculture, that does not restrict the 
use of off-farm inputs, could increase the risk that non-synthetic pesticides are 
increasingly used as substitutes for synthetic pesticides. A weak definition of integrated 
control that does not include a priority ladder of measures could have the effect that 
agricultural producers will go on with business-as-usual.  
6. The concept of legal pluralism in retrospect 
The theoretical concept of legal pluralism has been used in this paper as a means to 
analyse patterns and processes of regulation. By offering a pluralist perspective, the 
concept emphasizes the dynamics of regulatory processes and thus aims to cope with the 
globalisation of law and transnationalisation of regulation. Focusing on the issue-area of 
pesticide risk reduction, it is evident that the approaches developed by non-state actors 
are indeed sophisticated rule systems. Moreover, they perform similar functions as those 
established by state actors and are perceived by the addressees as having at least a similar 
binding force. A merit of the concept of legal pluralism is that it stimulates to take these 
forms of private regulation seriously and to understand that they are lasting phenomena. 
It thus draws the attention to issues related to the distribution of power and steering 
modes. Moreover, the concept provides a bridge between law and social sciences, in 
particular political sciences, and can open up new opportunities for mutual understanding 
and exchange between the disciplines.  
 
Returning to the observation of De Sousa Santos that in fact two types of 
transnationalisation are emerging in the legal field, one organized by “world capitalism” 
and the other by the “dominated, exploited and oppressed social groups and interests”, 
this paper concludes that the transnational rules in the issue-area of pesticide risk 
reduction are indeed being established by two different groups of non-state actors.19 
However, the actual contrast between the two groups is arguably less dramatic than 
phrased by Santos. Notably, the rise of organic agriculture certification has shown that a 
bottom-up regulatory system created by small farmer and consumer movements can serve 
as a catalyst in launching a viable alternative for conventional agriculture, as has been 
increasingly recognised by state actors and international organisations.20   
 
In his book “Global law without a state”, Günther Teubner has argued that contemporary 
law will grow mainly from the social peripheries, not from the political centres of nation-
states and international institutions.21 Although there may be some truth in this statement, 
it deserves at the same time to be put in perspective and to be carefully scrutinized. More 
specifically, it should be realised that regulation by non-state actors is not merely a 
spontaneous form of rule-making but that the legal order created by state actors has 
facilitated, or even stimulated, the emergence of non-state actor regulation. The reason 
that non-state actor approaches have started to proliferate can indeed be found in the 
hesitance of state actors to develop normative frameworks for the protection of the 
environment and human health at the international level, as has been the case in the issue-
area of pesticide risk reduction. Moreover, regulatory initiatives of the private sector have 
been fuelled by the lack of mechanisms to restrain economic power. Thus, the argument 
is that state actors have been accomplice to the rise of private governance. 
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7. Final observations 
This paper has given an example of the regulatory reconfiguration that is currently taking 
place in the relationships between state and non-state actors in a broader context. 
Comparable phenomena as have been found in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction 
can be found in other issue-areas. More precisely, this reconfiguration can be considered 
the consequence of increased deregulation and privatisation, trickling down to other 
levels, which can be aptly summarised as the globalisation of law. In the new 
configuration, rules have increasingly become an arena of competition, an important 
means of obtaining and maintaining economic power.  
 
From the perspective of law, the challenge is to find new answers to deal with “creeping 
globalisation, seemingly unstoppable and impossible to fully comprehend.”22 However, 
one of the pitfalls in responding to the current explosion of rules is the creation of 
additional layers of rules in a haphazard way.23 The option for the longer term should 
preferably be a move towards comprehensive frameworks at the international level that 
are more strongly based on values of equity and stewardship. 
 
Saving a last remark for the future of pesticide risk reduction. This paper has argued that 
considerations of consumer health have thus far been the main vehicle for regulatory 
approaches targeting pesticides. Due to new scientific findings about linkages between 
pesticides and major diseases, and fuelled by increasing concerns of the public, it can be 
expected that these considerations will gain additional strength in the next couple of 
years. However, it is not unthinkable that a fresh impetus for an accelerated conversion to 
more sustainable forms of agriculture will also come from different angles, as the 
evidence of the nutritional differences between conventional and organically produced 
agricultural products is mounting in favour of organic produce.24 In addition, the current 
debate about food miles is pushing local agricultural production. Such a shift could have 
as a consequence that production for export will diminish, which could have impacts on 
patterns of agricultural production and pesticide use. 
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